This crate aims to provide utilities for performing computations as securely as possible with respect to the underlying operating system.
Among the considered concepts:
- guarded memory allocations
- assists with read/write protecting sensitive data
- zeroes the allocated memory when handing it back to the operating system
- uses canary and garbage values to protect the memory pages.
- leverages NACL
libsodiumfor use on all supported platforms.
It's common to restrict the amount of memory that can a non-privileged user can lock into main memory (i.e. forbidden to be swapped out to disk).
The following limit is sufficient to make the tests pass:
ulimit -l $((1024*1024))
But it's quite likely that that command will fail because the system defaults are sometimes very strict. On Arch the file that manages those limits is limit.conf and the following addition raises the limit to sufficiently run the tests:
username hard memlock 1048576
Note also that the tests in the crate allocates a lot more memory than an application using these runtime utilities are expected to allocate: by the principle of least privilege only the necessary sensitive/cryptographic operations should be performed in the most restricted sandbox.
- encrypt/authenticate locked memory with a fast algorithm such as AES.
The primary components are:
- Guarded - A guarded type for protecting fixed-length secrets allocated on the heap.
- GuardedVec - A guarded type for protecting variable-length secrets allocated on the heap.
- Secret - A Type for guarding secrets allocated to the stack.
- ZeroingAlloc - A Zeroing Allocator which wraps the standard memory allocator. This allocator zeroes out memory when it is dropped.